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The paper traces the evolution of Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited (SNFL). At the outset we 
explore the background of SNFL, the motivation for the promoters to set up the organisation and 
how it has grown from the time it was taken over by the community trusts promoted by ASSEFA.  
 
As a part of the study, we examine the unique legal structure set up for federating the small 
SHGs that were widely spread out in the areas of its operation. The idea of federating the SHGs 
was to leverage the dispersed savings and interest earned on the initial donor resources that 
were made available to the SHGs at their early stages.  The aggregation of these  dispersed 
resources into SNFL enables the women SHGs to mobilise funds from commercial banks and 
specialised MFI lenders, for an accelerated growth of the movement. 
 
The paper examines the rationale for having this structure, its vulnerabilities and the possibilities 
for growth within the given structure. We argue that this is not a structure that can be replicated 
easily. We also argue that it cannot grow aggressively in the long run, unless some basic design 
changes are made. The paper also discusses the basic question on how to structure resources 
that are given by the donor community for the larger benefit of the poor; and when to bring in 
the individual stakes of the beneficiaries if one were to promote long lasting institutions. 
 
The paper also raises critical questions on governance and management. While appreciating the 
impressive result achieved by ASSEFA and BASIX in getting a community owned professionally 
managed institution into being, it also raises questions on whether there are inbuilt mechanisms 
of carrying forward this effectively in future – given the structuring of capital and rights of each 
of the constituents. 
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Community at the Core 











Association of Sarva Seva Farms (ASSEFA) was established in 1979 as a society under 
the Tamil Nadu Societies’ Registration Act. Though the organisation began its activities 
in 1969, it was informally working with the communities even before that as part of the 
Tamil Nadu Sarvodaya Mandal. ASSEFA worked on the Gandhian principles, and its initial 
work was in bringing about community farming in the lands that were donated under 
the bhoodan movement
3. Though the work started in TN and with bhoodan movement, 
the work of ASSEFA soon spread both in scope and geography. A major review and 
experimentation between the years 1982 to 1985 resulted in the transformation of 
ASSEFA from an organisation doing farm based development to village based 
development work. The work expanded to cover areas like animal husbandry village 
industries, afforestation housing, education and health, (Soumithri, u.d.)
4. 
Geographically ASSEFA expanded to states like Maharashtra, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Rajasthan.  
 
Given that the work was inspired not only by bhoodan by also associated principles of 
gramdaan and shramdaan the operating principles of ASSEFA were centered on the 
communities. The assets generated out of the grants received by ASSEFA were to be 
owned by the communities. Even benefits that were targeted at individuals were given 
as a soft loan to be contributed back to the community organisation, so that those 
resources could in turn be used for a larger good of the other members of the 
community. Thus all programmes undertaken by ASSEFA looked for a larger multiplier 
effect. Similarly it was also envisaged that not only the assets would be owned by the 
communities, but institutions set up for their benefit would also be ultimately owned by 
them. 
 
Building on its work with rural women, ASSEFA was involved in promoting Self-Help 
Groups (SHG) from late 1980s, but the activity gathered momentum in 1991. The early 
groups were promoted in active collaboration with the Tamil Nadu Women’s 
                                                 
1 Faculty member, Business Policy Area, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA).  
2 Corresponding author. Faculty Member, Centre for Management in Agriculture, IIMA. The research for this study was 
carried out under the Sir Ratan Tata Fund for Research Collaborations in Microfinance instituted at IIMA. Contact at 
mssriram@iimahd.ernet.in. The authors are thankful to Mr. R Sowmithri and Mr.Hemanta Kumar for spending time in 
explaining the operations of SNFL, and to Mr. Vijay Mahajan for extensive comments on the first draft of the paper. 
3 Bhoodan movement was spearheaded by Acharya Vinoba Bhave, who was a close follower of Mahatma Gandhi. This 
involved land owners voluntarily donating land to the communities. The land in turn would be used for development 
and made cultivable so that the poor communities could benefit from it. ASSEFA started work with trying to work on 
these common lands and later extended this philosophy to other areas of work. The operating philosophy of ASSEFA 
was “sarvodaya” (development of all). Both Bhoodan and Gramdan involved renunciation of private property in favour 
of commons. In case of Shramdan, it was assumed that since the poor did not have any property to gift, they would 
donate labour. 
4 Sowmithri, R (undated): Mid-Term Assessment of Women’s Development Program of ASSEFA (internal document of 
ASSEFA).    
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Development Corporation set up by the TN government. This project actively partnered 
with NGOs to promote SHGs under a women’s development programme which was 
supported by the International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD). The 
partnership with the government came to a close in 1999, but ASSEFA continued the 
work of promoting SHGs and also worked towards provision of enhanced and continuous 
access to credit for the SHGs. Most of ASSEFA’s groups were formed around savings and 
this savings pool was revolved as loans. While this was adequate at initial stages, it was 
also necessary to infuse external credit to accelerate livelihood generation activities in 
the groups. Under the IFAD project most of the SHGs were given capital development 
fund of Rs.15,000 per group as a grant. In most of the IFAD locations, ASSEFA had no 
prior projects and did not contribute any funds. The ASSEFA funds were in those 
locations where it had projects. All these funds were scattered in a large number of 
SHGs. It had not been possible to pool these funds and leverage larger institutional 
credit at competitive interest rates. One option available was to link the SHGs to the 
local banks. This process was time consuming and the effect would not have been 
uniform across several areas as the bank linkage largely depended on the enthusiasm of 
the local branch manager, and the encouragement that the bank gave to the linkage 
programme. 
 
The thinking within ASSEFA was that leveraging funds from mainstream sources would 
give a fillip to the SHG movement and enhance the access to resources for the 
communities. ASSEFA then thought of having a financial institution that could access 
funds from the mainstream so that this could be on-lent to the communities. The 
challenge however, was to ensure an ownership structure that honoured the principles 
for which ASSEFA stood – putting communities at the core and ensuring that these 
institutions were owned by the communities. This was not a simple task and they had to 
find innovative solutions for making the entity community owned. 
 
Background: Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited 
 
Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited (SNFL) was established in the year 1996 as a part of 
the BASIX group of companies in Hyderabad. The initial design of BASIX was to use 
Sarvodaya to make very small loans to individuals, addressing the microfinance needs of 
the poor – landless, marginal and small farmers and women, while a related company 
Bhartiya Samruddhi Finance Limited would make larger loans to micro-entrepreneurs 
and commercial farmers, who in turn generated livelihood opportunities to the poor. 
However, at the end of the two years of operation, BASIX group found that it was better 
to carry out all the lending operations through a single company and SNFL became 
dormant since 1999.  
 
At the same time, SHGs promoted by ASSEFA that were in existence since mid 1990s 
and yet were not able to mobilise funding from local banks. Thus ASSEFA was in search 
of a more reliable means by which mature SHGs with substantial own savings could 
access outside funds. ASSEFA’s founder Executive Director, Shri S Loganathan, was a 
member of BASIX Board since inception, and BASIX founder Managing Director, Mr. 
Vijay Mahajan was on the Board of ASSEFA for a number of years. Thus they decided to 
collaborate to address this issue. ASSEFA requested BASIX to evolve a strategy which 
would leverage the dispersed funds of SHGs into a financial structure to which banks 
and MF wholesale agencies would be willing to lend to.    
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ASSEFA and BASIX carried out a detailed assessment of the finances and capacities of 
the SHGs and came up with a strategy for aggregating them into a single multi-tier 
entity. Three options were considered: 
 
•  Establishing an SHG Federation as a Society under the Tamil Nadu Societies 
Registration Act,  in each block and state level confederation also as a Society  
 
•  Establishing a Savings and Credit Cooperative Society under the Tamil Nadu 
Cooperative Societies Act, Tamil Nadu, in each block and state level federation also 
as a Cooperative Society  
 
•  Establishing an SHG Federation as a Mutual Benefit Trust under the Indian Trusts 
Act, in each block and then these trusts invest in Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited 
 
 
The first alternative was not considered as the assessing team felt that a Society is not 
the appropriate legal form to undertake financial activities, such as bulk borrowing and 
on-lending to SHGs. While the concept of a mutual benefit company was widely used in 
Tamil Nadu urban areas, no examples existed of Mutual Benefit Trusts. 
 
Incorporation and Structure 
 
For ASSEFA to make the proposed organisation community owned there were limited 
options for incorporation. While a co-operative was ideally suited for such activities, the 
legislation in TN was control oriented with State constantly interfering in the governance 
and operational aspects. Moreover, ASSEFA found the co-operative legislation limiting 
due to geographical reasons. Co-operatives are governed by a provincial legislation and 
therefore it was difficult to establish a single co-operative that could have an area of 
operation spanning 3-4 states where ASSEFA’s SHG activities were being carried out. It 
was necessary that the new entity eventually be able to operate in Bihar, Rajasthan and 
Maharashtra where some SHG work had already been initiated. Therefore promoting a 
co-operative was not a viable option.  
 
Other forms of organisation were examined to see if it would suit the purpose of having 
a single entity that could be collectively owned by the communities. Since the object of 
the proposed organisation was to source bulk funds for on-lending to the SHGs, it was 
better if it were a commercial organisation. Therefore registering the entity as a Society 
or a Trust was not preferred. One possibility was to incorporate it as a company under 
Section 25 of the Companies Act
5. However this was also not considered as this would 
still not attract adequate capital for the purposes of leveraging funds from outside
6. 
Since ASSEFA wanted to set up an entity to access bulk finance for the SHGs, a for-
profit company with adequate equity was considered the best option. The choice 
obviously was to have a company that could be registered with the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI) under the Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC) regulations.  
                                                 
5 A Section 25 company is very much like a charitable institution – where, at the time of incorporation it is clear that the 
company does not intend to distribute surpluses to its shareholders. The residual even in case of liquidation would be 
used for a social cause rather than for compensating the shareholders. By definition, the share capital in such entities 
would be nominal. 
6 We shall later see a small fallacy in this argument, considering the operating details of SNFL.    
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By the time ASSEFA decided to promote an NBFC, the regulatory environment in the 
country had become extremely tight following a scam in the NBFC sector and it was 
difficult to promote new NBFCs. The process of registration was bound to take time even 
after the necessary minimum capital of Rs. 20 million was put in. Mr. Loganathan, the 
Executive Director of ASSEFA was on the board of the BASIX group of companies that 
owned a 100% stake in SNFL. SNFL had obtained the necessary registration from the 
RBI, but due to consolidation of activities within BASIX group, was lying dormant. It was 
therefore proposed that the communities assisted by ASSEFA acquire the share holding 
in SNFL. 
 
While the decision was that the communities would own the company getting them to 
contribute share capital in the SNFL was not going to easy. The number of individuals 
participating in the SHG programme of ASSEFA had crossed 70,000 spread out in nearly 
4,000 SHGs. It was difficult for each of these individuals to become share holders of the 
company because that would involve getting contributions for each individual. In any 
case, the plan was to pool in all the resources that was brought in from outside – the 
capital development fund given to the SHG, other financial resources brought in by 
ASSEFA into a centralised place, therefore it was pointless to approach individuals 
ASSEFA had records on how much each SHG had received as external funding and this 
was the amount sought to be brought into the proposed company as an equity base. 
 
These common resources resided in individual SHGs as a group fund. In addition to the 
externally contributed group fund, interest earnings of SHGs were ploughed back into 
group fund. ASSEFA was interested in only tapping the donated resources from the 
group fund. At this level it meant getting SHGs to be shareholders in the proposed 
company. However as SHGs were only informal associations of people, getting them to 
be members of the company was not possible. ASSEFA had to find an intermediary 
mechanism that would address the issue of community ownership. The objective was to 
move the company towards community governance and if possible to community 
management – but the first step was to vest the ownership in the communities. 
 
The design was to have an intermediary mechanism that would pool the resources of 
individual SHGs and then transfer these resources to SNFL as equity. While designing 
this, there was a larger objective – these intermediary institutions would not only act as 
mechanism for funnelling the financial resources from the SHGs, but would eventually 
become pivotal points for the larger work of ASSEFA with the communities. It was 
envisaged that these intermediary organisations could take up education, rights and 
other issues that affect the membership in general. 
 
One of the options examined was to set up a series of Section 25 companies at the 
intermediary level. This did not find favour because companies could not have SHGs as 
members and having individual shareholders was difficult, given the large numbers. It 
was envisaged that these intermediary organisations would not only pool capital from 
SHGs, but also act as on-lending agencies when SNFL wanted to downstream loans to 
the SHGs. SHGs also had to be federated at some level so that common issues could be 
taken up. It was then decided that the confederating unit should be at the block level 
and these units could in turn hold the equity in SNFL. The block level units could by    
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community managed, so that eventually, using the experience of management of block 
level units, some people could be inducted into the governance of SNFL. 
 
It was envisaged that the block level confederation would be representing around 200 
SHGs. However, it was found that this was a large unit, and further co-ordination would 
be needed. Therefore, the SHGs were federated informally at a cluster level. Each 
cluster would represent around 40 SHGs, and around 4-5 clusters would be represented 
in the block level confederation. It was also decided that the staffing pattern of SNFL 
would ensure that there would be a field officer in charge at each cluster and then a 
Manager at the block level. The cluster level set up was to be purely informal in nature 
and would only be used as an administrative unit. It was also envisaged that each 
cluster would throw up a representative from the community, who would represent 
them in the block level entity. 
 
After examination of alternative forms – it was finally decided that the block level 
entities would be registered as “Mutual Benefit Trusts (MBT)”.  These would be private, 
determinable trusts, that is they would have specified beneficiaries/members and they 
would not be public charitable trusts, which is the most common form. These trusts 
would be promoted by ASSEFA, the Executive Director of ASSEFA being the settler 
making an initial contribution of Rs.1,000 to set up each trust. Each SHG would then be 
required to pay a one time non-refundable contribution of Rs.1,000 and also contribute 
to the MBT an amount equivalent to the capital development fund and other revolving 
funds given by ASSEFA. Though there was no legal binding on getting these monies into 
the MBT, the promoters felt that this was a fair demand to make of the SHGs. The 
Rs.1,000 contribution would be retained by the MBTs, while other funds received as 
contribution from the SHGs would be invested in SNFL as equity.  
 
The MBTs would then be eligible to borrow and on lend it to SHGs. The equity and 
lending decisions were de-linked from the contributions and it was possible that an MBT 
having contributed significant equity did not get a proportionate loan, if its SHGs were 
not assessed as healthy. The MBTs would earn a small margin for intermediation. Since 
the returns expected were not significant and MBTs would only make small surpluses, 
taxability of the income was not a critical dimension that dictated the form of 
organisation. It was expected that the surpluses would be retained and added to the 
capital fund of the MBT. Over a period of time, it was expected that this fund could be 
used for activities beyond microfinance. It was not envisaged that the MBTs would 
contribute any further to the equity of SNFL beyond the amount identified initially. 
 
Governance of MBTs 
 
Each MBT has a governing body of 9 persons. The chairperson of the MBT was 
appointed by the settler. This was usually the ASSEFA Development Manager in charge 
of the block. This person was an employee of ASSEFA, on deputation to SNFL. There 
were two other persons nominated by the settler, thereby giving the settler a say in 
nominating a third of the trustees, including the chairperson. Four trustees were drawn 
from the community. This was done through an annual election at the cluster level and 
one person represented each cluster. Though the cluster was not a formal division, 
operationally that was how the trustees were elected. Two other positions were left for    
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the seven trustees to co-opt. These positions were reserved for members of the 
community being benefited under the other activities carried out by ASSEFA. 
 
The process of forming MBTs started in June 2001. Each MBTs was not only registered 
properly by filing a trust deed at the Deputy Registrar’s office in the District, they also 
held meetings regularly. All MBTs were audited by qualified chartered accountants and 
filed income tax returns. SNFL closely monitored the finalisation of accounts of the MBTs 
and also re-conciled the figures with its own books, before publishing its own accounts. 
This ensured that there was a close co-ordination between the MBTs and SNFL. SNFL 
saw this as a process of hand-holding till the MBTs learnt to manage their affairs 
independently. This worked because of perfect dovetailing – SNFL did not have any 
loaning to parties other than MBTs, nor did it source equity from elsewhere. MBTs were 
encouraged to source loans only from SNFL. Therefore it made immense sense to 
reconcile the books of these entities with each other. 
 
When we carefully examine the structure described above, we realise that the equity 
funds in SNFL were coming only partially out of the resources of the community, while a 
substantial part was coming from the grant funds received by ASSEFA and given to the 
groups. Given that these were community resources, it made sense to have the share 
holding in a community organisation rather than in the name of the poor individuals. 
However we cannot ignore the implications on the governance of MBTs, in terms of 
dependence on ASSEFA We shall discuss this in greater detail later. However at this 
point it may be important to look at what it meant to the stakes of the people who 
would benefit from the programme. 
 
Poor individuals were members of the SHG movement. They had built stakes in the 
SHGs through their initial contribution, periodic savings and accumulated surpluses from 
the loaning programme. Therefore, the members had a strong incentive to govern and 
ensure that the group functioned as long as the lending programme was useful. The 
design was that the groups would continue in perpetuity – any withdrawal from the 
group gave the members access only to their own savings on termination of 
membership and not a share in the common resources. Therefore in the minds of the 
members, the common resources in the group would not have found a place of primacy. 
 
At the same time we have to remember that these funds actually came to the SHGs and 
therefore the SHGs would had a sense of collective ownership on the funds. The time 
lag between the funds coming into the SHGs, and going out as contribution to MBTs was 
significant. The groups had also put these funds to good use, by lending internally. 
Therefore when these funds were being taken out of circulation to be upstreamed 
against a promise of higher loans, the SHGs asked questions and in some instances had 
to be convinced that this was in their larger long term interests. This was building in 
accountability. SHGs felt that it was their common fund that was going in and not some 
grant money that was going into the structure. 
 
ASSEFA gradually reduced its grant based activities in areas where MBTs were formed 
and put its efforts on promoting microfinance based activities in these areas. This gave a 
message to the SHGs that, as they became more and more stable, they would be dealt 
with in commercial terms rather than developmental terms. SNFL was the commercial 
face, and all support was to be expected from there, rather than ASSEFA.     
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7 All statistics are rounded off and represent the position on 31 March 2004. 
A dotted arrow indicated informal relations, a double lined arrow indicates the movement of loan funds and a regular 
arrow indicates equity investments and governance relationships. 
Sarvodaya Mutual Benefit Trusts: 
Sources of funds: 
Contribution from SHGs, Entrance Fees, 
Internal Accruals, Loans from SNFL for on-
lending 
Uses of Funds: 
Investment in equity of SNFL, Loans to 
member SHGs, Fixed Assets 
Entrance fees is neither lent nor invested in 
SNFL. It is kept as a fixed deposit as a 
liquidity buffer. 
Governance: 
General body meeting attended by 
chairperson, secretary and treasurer of 
SHGs. 
9 member board of trustees – Chair of the 
trust being ASSEFA employee, two members 
nominated by settler. 
Four members elected from cluster SHGs 
Two members co-opted from other ASSEFA 
programs. 
Number of MBTs ~55 
Number of MBTs borrowing from SNFL ~45 
Cluster level SHG federation: 
No financial transactions, no legal entity. 
Represents around 5 SHGs, 200 members 
Function: 
Co-ordination amongst individual SHGs. 
Informal election of one person to represent 
in the governance of MBT 
A geographical unit for the field executives of 
SNFL to cover 
SHG(each SHG having around 15-20 members, never 
exceeding 20). 
Sources of funds: 
Membership fees, Grants and revolving funds received, 
savings of members, internal accruals, loans from outside 
Uses: 
Loans to the communities, investment in MBT, retention. 
Governance: 
Three members elected as chairperson, treasurer and 
secretary. These three eligible to attend the general body 







Number of individuals 
in groups formed by 
ASSEFA: ~125,000 
Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited 
Sources of Funds: 
Equity contribution from Sarvodaya MBTs 
(No other equity to be accepted except 
for a token equity from promoters) 
Loans from Financial Institutions 
Internal Accruals 
Uses of Funds 
Loans to MBTs, Salaries and 
administration of field staff, other 
expenses (No intent to pay dividend to 
MBTs) 
Equity: Rs.75 million 
Loan Assets Outstanding: Rs.140 million 
Governance: 
General body attended by chairpersons 
of MBTs (as of now employees of 
SNFL/ASSEFA) 
Board currently has 7 professional 
independent directors – to be expanded 
to add 5 more from the community.
Linkages between the community and SNFL    
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Governance of SNFL 
 
Organisationally this structure ensured that the common funds of the groups that came 
from external sources were pooled in a single place. This could be leveraged to raise 
more resources for the communities. However, the question was who would be in 
charge of the funds so pooled? At inception, it was agreed that SNFL would not accept 
equity investments from institutional sources. There was a potential of BASIX group 
having some equity, as they were the initial promoters and there was no conflict of 
interest. The Small Industries Development Bank of India through its SIDBI Foundation 
for Micro Credit (SFMC) was another potential source from which equity funds could 
have been tapped so that the base could be significantly expanded to leverage more 
funds. However, SNFL wanted to be truly community owned save for a token equity of 
initial promoter individuals which added up to less than 1% of the total equity. 
 
There were some ideological reasons to have this company as (almost) fully owned by 
the community MBTs. However, while SNFL was community owned, it was not 
community governed. One could say that SNFL was professionally governed. Like 
several widely held companies listed on the stock exchange, the ownership of SNFL was 
de-linked from the management. SNFL had members on the board who were there for 
reasons of merit rather than share-holding. The board of SNFL consisted of seven 
directors. Three of them were promoter directors of BASIX. Two others were chief 
executives in two BASIX companies. The chief executive of SNFL was also on the rolls of 
BASIX and had been seconded to work full time with SNFL. The only person 
representing the communities was the Executive Director of ASSEFA, who was also the 
Chair of SNFL.  
 
The constitution of the board was based on trusteeship. Like in most organisations in 
the development sector, the board had little representation from the community. One of 
the reasons was that the SHG members were not ready to take up governance positions. 
The structure was complicated and it needed professionals to manage it. What was 
surprising in the SNFL – MBT structure was that the representatives of the communities 
had limited say in the General Body of SNFL. This was because the MBTs were 
represented by their respective chairpersons in the annual general meeting of SNFL. We 
have to remember that these chairpersons were appointed by the settler and were 
employees of SNFL – either directly or indirectly. The participation of the SHG-members 
was limited to electing 4 representatives to the MBT board. The only way that the 
trustees could influence the governance was by advising their respective chairpersons to 
air the concerns and raise issues in the annual general meeting. As we can see, this link 
was bound to be weak. 
 
SNFL was aware of this issue. There were plans to expand the board and induct five 
members from the SHGs. The process of induction into the board of SNFL was to be in 
the format of a co-option rather than an election. The process of election from amongst 
more than 70,000 members was complicated. It was envisaged that the community 
representation would be restricted to women, and they would be chosen from MBTs 
where they had shown leadership qualities – had been on the board of the MBT for at 
least a year, had some basic education (should have passed intermediate examination) 
and had a potential to contribute to the governance of SNFL. In addition, the proposed 
director should have been a member of a non-defaulting group and she herself had no    
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outstandings. These aspects were expected to be minuted and the articles of SNFL 
amended to formally acknowledge the change in governance structure. This change was 
to be effected in 2004-05. As of now, one could only say that SNFL was a community 
owned, professionally governed institution. Even in the future, two factors were etched 
in the trust deed of the MBTs that were difficult to change: 
1.  The chairperson of the MBT would represent the Trust in the general body of SNFL. 
2.  The chairperson of MBT was to be appointed by the settler - the Executive Director 
of ASSEFA. 
This meant that representation in the governance structure of SNFL would always be on 
a nomination. However, the change that could occur as the trusts grew stronger would 
be that the chairpersons who were Business Development Managers and employed by 
ASSEFA/SNFL could be employed and accountable to the MBTs. To that extent they 
would be under the overall supervision and control of the community representatives on 
the trust. 
 
Management of SNFL 
 
SNFL entered into a management contract with the BASIX group. Under the contract, 
the operations of SNFL were managed by BASIX through a representation on the board 
and also by seconding a chief executive to look after the day-to-day operations. 
 
Management of MBTs 
 
The MBTs were designed to function independently as they grew. To ensure this, each 
MBT had hired a chief executive officer – who was fully paid by them. There was a 
cluster-in-charge who was hired by the MBTs and would manage one cluster. Eventually 
it was expected that the chief executives hired by the MBTs would carry on the larger 
agenda of working towards social causes beyond microfinance. 
 
It was expected that when an MBT grew beyond a certain limit, it would be split. This 
was designed to ensure that the MBTs did not become too unwieldy. If a target of more 
than 300 SHGs in the membership and Rs.900 million in outstanding was achieved; it 
was considered a fit case for a split.  
 
The MBTs would maintain their own accounts and get them audited at the end of every 
financial year. They would also file tax returns and hold a general body meeting where 
the performance would be presented and the members to the trust were elected. It was 
expected that the surpluses made by MBTs would be retained. Every year 10% of the 
surpluses were to be kept as general reserve, and the rest of the surpluses allocated to 
the groups in proportion to their initial contribution. However this money could not be 
withdrawn even on termination of membership of the SHGs.  
 
The new SHGs that joined in the MBTs were expected to get in contributions only if they 
had received group or development funds from donors/ASSEFA. Otherwise, no new 
group was expected to contribute to the corpus of the MBT, except for the initial 
contribution of Rs.1,000. The contribution of the SHGs, over and above this initial 
contribution of Rs.1,000 would be invested in SNFL. The shares in SNFL were held in the 
name of each MBT and the application and other documents would be signed by the    
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chairperson. The MBT would pass a specific resolution authorising the chairperson to 
sign and acquire shares in SNFL. 
 
The only source of finance for MBTs was SHG contribution and borrowings from SNFL. It 
was again etched in the trust deed that the MBTs would in no way be accessing the 
savings of the poor parked in the SHGs. The SHGs were free to use the savings for 
internal lending purposes or deposit them in the bank. The margins of the MBTs came 
from the spread between their borrowing from SNFL at 12% per annum declining and 
the lending rate to the SHGs at 15% per annum flat. This spread was sufficient for the 
maintenance of the MBTs and retain a small surplus. In addition it is important to 
consider the following observation made by M-Cril “The operations of the MBTs are also 
subsidised by ASSEFA to a great extent. ASSEFA in turn meets the costs from grants for 
its integrated rural development interventions (through various international donors)”.
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The SHGs in turn did not retain any margin. Most of the work for the SHGs was done by 
the employees of the MBT, including maintenance of books. Therefore the SHGs possibly 
did not need too much of a margin. However, they did have a margin on the internal 
lending of member savings that was collected monthly. The SHGs did not pay any 
interest on the member-savings and the spread coming out of this was sufficient for the 
SHGs to break even and make some margins. 
 
Management of SNFL 
 
SNFL was managed by professionals. The chief executive was on deputation from BASIX 
and he was assisted by a chief operating officer and other staff. Most of the other staff 
were hired by ASSEFA and deputed to SNFL. There was a well defined structure of 
reporting and performance appraisals. 
 
At the very outset, recognising the need to manage the company professionally, ASSEFA 
signed a contract with BASIX to provide a range of management services all the way 
from deputing a COO (who later became the CEO), to specifics like installing an MIS.  
The following were the main points covered in an MOU signed. 
 
•  Business Plan 2001-2001 
•  Developing appropriate products and delivery channels 
•  Software for Sarvodaya – financial accounting and MIS for loan portfolio, incl training of 
staff 
•  Operations Manual for loan appraisal, approval, disbursement, monitoring and recovery 
•  Internal Control and Audit Systems – establishing and staff training 
•  Statutory compliance systems for RBI NBFC regulations, Company Law, Income Tax and 
other applicable laws establishing and staff training 
•  Business Plan Quarterly Review training 
•  Assistance in raising additional borrowings from India and abroad 
•  Staff training in accounting, appraisal, fund management 
 
                                                 
8 MCril 2004: Microfinance Rating-Risk Assessment. Reproduced with the permission of SIDBI who commissioned the 
ratings and have copyrights on the rating document.    
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The senior management of BASIX, apart from serving on the Board of SNFL, also made 
periodic trips to SNFL and gave detailed guidance notes to the COO.  An example of one 
such is attached in Annexure 2. As can be seen the role of BASIX has been crucial in the 
management of the SNFL and ensuring that the company is run on the lines of a 
trusteeship of a community owned institution. 
 
The Role of SNFL vis-a-vis SMBTs 
 
The role of SNFL was two fold – the first was to source equity from the MBTs to ensure 
that they had adequate capital. A target on how much capital had to be sourced from 
each MBT was spelt out based on the records of ASSEFA’s contribution to the common 
fund of the group. Around Rs.75 million were already sourced from the MBTs and it was 
expected that Rs. 135 million would be collected in about 4 years time. The annual 
target for increasing equity was Rs.15 million per year in the next four years. This was 
not easy as the funds had already gone into the circulation within the SHGs. They had to 
be convinced that investing in SNFL via the MBT was in the larger interest of a greater 
multiplier. Collecting share capital from MBTs was somewhat similar to loan recovery as 
the old common funds were being asked to be turned in. Follow up was needed if the 
MBT had not invested their common funds fully in SNFL or when new SHGs were 
admitted into the MBT. While the initial contribution of Rs.1,000 to the MBTs were 
maintained as a liquidity buffer within the MBTs, the other contributions were passed on 
to SNFL. The share allotment committee of SNFL met once in a month and allotted the 
shares to these MBTs. This was later ratified in the quarterly board meeting. The 
allotment of shares was termed as private placement, done on a routine basis without 
much regulatory intervention. The regulatory intervention was limited because SNFL was 
a privately held, non-listed company. 
 
The second role of SNFL was to provide adequate finances to the SHGs. As a related 
activity, SNFL had to raise loans from the external market to leverage the equity put in 
by the MBTs. SNFL had an internal appraisal system and the loans were given according 
to the ratings obtained by the SHGs. While the loans were actually made to the MBTs, it 
was individual SHG applications that were appraised. The SHGs would put in an 
application to the MBT for a loan; these applications would be pooled and presented to 
SNFL. SNFL would in turn appraise each SHG application, and make a bulk loan to the 
MBT, indicating to which SHG it had to be on-lent. 
 
There were some small problems in the field pertaining to the loan amounts. The equity 
raised from SHGs through MBTs was based on the common fund available. This formed 
the base for SNFL to leverage loans in the market. However the same formula was not 
used as a base for approval and disbursement of loans to SHGs. There the appraisal was 
based on the overall health of the SHG based on a scoring system. Since the 
contributions were based on the past donor funding made to the groups, it was likely 
that the contribution of the older groups were much higher than the recent ones (which 
did not have IFAD capital development grant). This anomaly between contribution and 
the ultimate loan amount approved created some dissonance amongst the groups. 
 
Another important feature was that while the loan from SNFL to the MBTs went as a 
single bulk loan in the books, the basis of approval was through individual application 
forms submitted by the SHGs to the respective MBTs. MBTs in turn forwarded these    
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applications to SNFL and loans were approved and disbursed based on a consolidation of 
these independent SHG applications. Operationally MBTs were having only a limited role 
in deciding the lending norms, which was centrally decided. MBTs had a role in lending 
decisions at their level. This assumed greater significance as the business development 
managers of SNFL also doubled up as the chairpersons of the MBTs. 
 
The transition from a decentralised ASSEFA managed programme to a more centralised 
SNFL was not easy. In the earlier dispensation since each region had an ASSEFA person, 
and this person was overall in-charge of the resources and also had fair amount of 
decision making powers on the nature of utilization of resources. When this activity got 
professionalized and centralised the older staff resented it. However this did not pose a 
great hurdle in consolidation, but in some cases made the consolidation slow. 
 
SNFL for itself had small spread. As the MCril report points out, some aspects of SNFL’s 
operations were cross subsidised by ASSEFA. This might not be the case in future, but 
with a thin spread, it was unlikely that SNFL would plough back significant amounts of 
profits into circulation, even if they continued the present policy of “zero dividends”. As 
SNFL would not like the MBTs to invest more money than the group funds that came as 
grants, there would be an issue with re-capitalisation in future, particularly if SNFL wants 




SNFL had set an aggressive target of reaching out further in TN and also reaching out in 
other locations where they were active. The targets for the next few years were to 
increase the current membership from 55 MBTs to 100 MBTs, achieving an outstanding 
for Rs. 1 billion (current outstanding – Rs. 470 million) and keeping the repayment rate 
at 100%. The MBTs would be from TN, but they expected to form around 15 to 20 MBTs 
in all from Bihar, Maharashtra and Rajasthan states. To achieve this level of lending, it 
was imperative that SNFL had to borrow a fair amount from the market. It was possible 
to raise resources from the market as there were willing institutional lenders to chip in. 
However SNFL itself had to have adequate capital for leveraging external funds. 
 
A Rs. 1 billion lending programme entailed an equity base of around Rs.200 million for 
the lenders to be comfortable. The pooling of the community funds would at best fetch 
a cumulative amount of Rs. 150 million. Therefore, there was a need for SNFL to look at 
alternative ways of raising capital. Getting in institutional equity and from other 
individuals was not acceptable in principle and therefore there had to be a mechanism 
wherein the communities would continue to get involved in the process. SNFL had some 
plans for this. 
 
In the late 1980s Mr.Loganathan, Executive Director of ASSEFA felt that the funds raised 
from various donors was being spent routinely and there had to be some order in the 
way these funds were channelised and managed. In 1989, with the active support of 
ASSEFA, Sarva Jana Seva Kosh (SJSK) was incorporated as a company. This was 
expected to be a financial services company that would manage the community 
resources of the entire programme. In fact the early seeds of the SNFL idea were sown 
in SJSK. However, as SJSK was not adequately capitalised, it did not manage to get 
registration to function as an NBFC when the new norms came into place in 1997. The    
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structure of SJSK was similar to that as SNFL, but it was thin and hollow. The Nidhi 
Foundation at the primary level was similar to an SHG, except that it dealt with other 
livelihood generation projects and not microfinance. Similarly there was a block level 
confederation of these Nidhi Foundations. The structure is depicted in the flow chart 
below (Figure 2). MBTs for SNFL were mostly being established in places where the 
Nidhi Foundations were weak, or did not exist, to ensure that there was minimal 
overlap. It was planned that the funds with Nidhi Foundations would also be eventually 
consolidated in SNFL, through SJSK. All foundations would – through a similar structure 
contribute to SJSK and SJSK in turn would make a bulk investment in SNFL. In doing 
this, all the funds belonging to the communities could be gathered at a centralised place 
and could be used for better leveraging. The restructuring of SJSK and the process of 





Overall, it was expected that the funds with the communities would be sufficient to fund 
all expansion plans in the medium range. The challenge was, however to go beyond TN 
and look at other states. The plans were that the Bihar operations would start in June 
2004 and the Rajasthan operations would pick up by 2005-06. In addition to getting 






Village republic that 
manages community 
resources, gets the 
funds as grants from 
ASSEFA 




(depending on the project) 
Nidhi Foundation 
(Primary level association of community members) 
notarised and informal – Funding to the communities 
and receiving the money back. Money would reside in 
the village and be used for other purposes 
Funds comes to the 
community and have to 
be repaid back to the 
Nidhi Foundation  
Block level federation of Nidhi Foundations 
covering around 30-40 primary funds. No 
financial transaction, only co-ordination 
across various projects and funding. 
Sarva Jana Seva Kosh 
(Incorporated as a company) 
Provided advisory services to 
the foundations for fund 
management and project 
management. A service fee 
charged for the services. 
Figure 2: Other community organisations and funds managed under ASSEFA    
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like capacity building from organisations like SIDBI Foundation for MicroCredit (SFMC). 
Therefore there were no serious problems expected in the medium term. With the 
current capitalisation structure, it was possible to leverage adequate funds from external 
sources – particularly from institutions interested in microfinance such as SFMC, ICICI 
Bank, ABN-Amro Bank and other commercial banks. 
 
The MBTs were not expected to plough back their surpluses to SNFL, though they were 
expected to have some surpluses on account of the spread they got from the financial 
intermediation they did between SNFL and SHGs. As ASSEFA’s larger interest was in 
holistic development, MBTs were expected to utilise the surpluses for larger social good. 
For instance, some of the MBTs were already engaging themselves in hiring teachers for 
the community schools, arranging for mass marriages so that consumption expenses on 
social events could be minimised. Some were investing in health and other projects. The 
structure was designed so that the external funding received for the various projects 
would form the basis for leveraging more commercial funds for the poor, while all the 
surpluses generated by the communities would be ploughed back to the communities. 
SNFL as a community owned, professionally managed institution was involved in 
intermediation and leveraging that was sorely needed by the poor. 
 
Concerns about the current structure 
 
While the current structure did consolidate all the funds that were floating around 
inefficiently in the system, it raised some concerns in the short and long term, which 
were to be addressed. It is true that for the type of operations that is expected out of 
SNFL, a company could be ideally suited as it has to leverage funds from the 
mainstream and was most accepted in the banking circles. But the concern that this 
structure raised was that of centralisation of decision making in the Executive Director 
(ED) of ASSEFA. This was specific to the ASSEFA-SNFL situation and need not be an 
essential feature of the MBT-NBFC design. This was because the ED was the settler of 
all the MBTs and the chairmen who represent the MBTs in the general body of SNFL are 
appointed by the ED. This was a vulnerable structure in case proper succession with 
appropriate checks and balances were not set up for the office of the ED. 
 
In addition, while the structure did have a logic in sourcing funds from SHG/MBTs and 
linking the amount of funds to be sourced from SHG/MBTs to the common donor funds, 
it did not translate into proportional control rights for MBTs that put in greater amounts 
of funds. The amount of funds sought from the MBTs also did not bear any relation to 
their borrowing capacity, while SNFL itself was structured in such a way that its net-
owned-funds (contributed by MBTs) became critical in sourcing money from outsiders. 
Dividends in any case were not to be declared. So, either way little incentive was built 
within the organisational structure for further capitalisation. It also did not foster 
informal control because of a lack of link with MBT stakes and the service usage. Even 
the basic co-operative principles of patronage based stake and control did not seem to 
be in work here. 
 
The justification for a for-profit NBFC weakened when we considered that SNFL did not 
intend to make large margins. Their spread at the time of the study was 2% on 
borrowed funds (Interest charged was 12% per annum and borrowings from SFMC was    
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at 10% per annum).
9 In addition to the fact that the spread was low, there was no 
intent to pay dividends. In such a case, there was no reason to dispense with the idea of 
setting up a section 25 company rather than and NBFC. 
 
The MBTs themselves had an open structure and the SHGs could join in at any stage as 
long as they fulfilled the criteria. However, unlike co-operatives the SHGs could not 
sever the relationship with the MBT – as there was little incentive to do this even if 
MBTs did not perform. Since this was a Trust, all contributions from the independent 
SHGs would be in the form of non-withdrawable stakes. This was unlike co-operatives 
where one could withdraw the share capital on termination of membership or in case of 
companies where the shares could be sold if there was a market. Similarly we need to 
understand that MBTs contribute to the equity of SNFL, which was difficult to liquidate, 
unless there was an active stock market on which the shares of SNFL were listed. It was 
unlikely that a sound secondary market to the shares of SNFL would exist if it had an 
avowed policy of not declaring dividend and not having any other members. 
 
In case of SHGs that were investing in MBTs, they continued to be vulnerable. 
Technically if an SHG dissolves, all the residuals in the group were to be shared amongst 
the members themselves in a pre-agreed proportion. However, the SHG itself could not 
encash its investment from the MBTs. If there was a run on some of the SHGs for loss of 
faith, it would be really difficult to recoup the situation. However, experience indicates 
that SHGs being closely knit cohesive entities are unlikely to have a run. But this 
technicality may have to be considered in case of replication of such structures. 
 
This design assumed that the communities are at the core, but the programme was to 
be governed and managed by professionals. It encouraged community participation, but 
this was more through co-option than through democratic processes. This is seen as a 
transitional arrangement and perhaps in five to seven years since inception, the 
company will get substantially managed by the members. Already some of MBTs have 
women members as CEOs. There was a mismatch between people’s stakes and 
governance rights. Though the stakes that were in the name of SHGs had come from 
the efforts of ASSEFA, these were in circulation in the groups for a while. Therefore the 
communities assumed a right to use these funds. Setting a target to recoup the grants 
as equity contribution negated the voluntariness of association and participation. The 
structure would have made more sense if the stakes of the MBTs and in turn the stakes 
of SHGs in MBTs had some linkage to the patronage and business rather than in the 
form of recouping common funds. This would have provided greater scope for further 
investments from the groups if they found the services of SNFL satisfactory. 
 
The plan for getting investments from the SJSK and also other wings of ASSEFA such as 
the habitat fund also did not look very convincing, because the core benefits of 
investments went back to the microfinance SHGs. In any case – subscribing to equity in 
SNFL could not be considered as a great investment opportunity as SNFL did not intend 
to give great returns. However, given that the institutions belong to the same family of 
entities, the consideration for investment need not have been returns, but the larger 
benefit of the communities. To that extent, one could expect further investments to flow 
in.  
 
                                                 
9 M-Cril (2004): Rating report.    
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Regulatory Issues 
 
The case of SNFL and all its inter-relations indicates the lack of an appropriate legislative 
framework in the country to ensure that grant and donor funds can be leveraged to the 
larger good of the poor communities. When we look at some of the large successful 
developmental programmes in the country like the operation flood programme 
implemented by the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), we find that these 
programmes have been successful by harnessing inexpensive aid from multilateral 
sources and using the aid as a basis for large scale replication of economic programmes. 
For instance, in case of NDDB, it received large amounts of commodity aid from Europe 
which was then sold here at market prices to create a basic fund for setting up this 
country’s largest developmental programme in the dairying and livestock sector. The 
multiplier effect was achieved not because aid was used to transfer benefits to the end 
users as a one way flow, but because aid was used as a base capital for getting a 
multiplier effect. 
 
If we examine the trend in the microfinance in particular and development sector in 
general, the funding is moving more towards providing “revolving funds” to groups of 
individuals rather than one time front-ended subsidy. Experience shows that this could 
be more lasting than a one time aid. Unfortunately there are no appropriate legal 
structures where these funds could be consolidated and used for the larger benefit of 
the poor.To that extent one could see the MBT structure as an innovation to garner such 
dispersed grant funds. When we examine NDDB experience, we find that it was possible 
for NDDB to adopt this strategy as the state established NDDB as a body corporate, with 
all the exemptions granted including taxation benefits till the network was fully 
established. 
 
We do not seem to have such a unified strategy for financial services in the country, 
though there are several attempts at reaching out basic capital and offer savings facility 
to the poor. 
 
Ideally, given the considerations of building stakes of the beneficiaries and pooling of 
resources, the co-operative legislation would have been most appropriate for the type of 
activities that ASSEFA-SNFL have been carrying out. The basic contours of the 
programme of ASSEFA were: 
1.  Open-ness to take new members and new groups as the programme grew; 
2.  Build in a large community stake so that the professionals remain accountable to the 
people for whom the aid was meant; and 
3.  Extending the benefits of the programme for activities beyond just microfinance. 
 
A co-operative provides for open membership, democratic control and also allows 
enough flexibility for organisations to do multiple activities with its members. Since co-
operatives are expected to be user-owned organisations, one does not see potential 
conflicts of interest even if multiple activities are taken up as long as the activities meet 
the common needs of the membership. 
 
Unfortunately the co-operative legislation in India never lived up to the principles and 
spirit of co-operation. The legislation is also restrictive and due to successive 
interference by the State, has become an anathema for development practitioners. As    
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co-operation is a state subject, organisations working in multiple states find it difficult to 
carry out activities under this legislation. 
 
There are some other questions SNFL case opens up to us. It is important to examine if 
the legislation governing trusts does indeed provide a stable solution for harnessing the 
community resources. Since there have been no significant issues pertaining to the 
legislative framework in the microfinance sector, that have gone for litigation and 
review, this is an unexplored area. 
 
Issues for scaling up and replication 
 
Irrespective of the legislative options, the structure adopted by ASSEFA-SNFL is 
complicated. While the SHG structure is simple and well tested and is working across the 
country, what is lacking is an intermediary federal structure. ASSEFA-SNFL model chose 
to have private MBTs as an intermediary structure. While a great deal could be built into 
the MBTs in the way their deeds are framed, it seems to be a complicated structure to 
undertake intermediation in commercial microfinance. While there seem to be 
democratic systems operating in the intermediary MBTs, we find that ultimately the 
representation in SNFL is given through a nominated chairperson. The process in 
nominating the chairperson or the election to the board of trustees of the MBT does not 
recognise the stakes built in by the individual SHGs. Of course, it is not necessary that in 
replication of this structure, the same feature should be followed, and we could have 
internal structures that recognise the stakes and the patronage systems. Since trusts are 
not organisations having share-holding, the rights on residual claims on liquidation does 
not belong to the members of the trust. This is justified because the stakes were never 
built out of the personal resources of each of the members, so it is just as well that the 
residual claims on liquidation belong to the society at large. 
 
While there is no internal contradiction in the structure – that resources given to the 
community are held by the community and is structured in a manner that no individual 
benefits, the structure does not foster growth, as there is no incentive for the individual 
beneficiaries to contribute back their own resources in the long run when they are 
indeed in a position to do so. Secondly, this structure cannot attract outside equity 
easily. While in the short run, it is an effective marriage of community ownership and 
professional management and governance, in the long run it is vulnerable to adverse 
usage. 
 
Obviously this structure has impairments in scaling up to significance in future. If indeed 
SNFL were to scale up, it had to have a hybrid ownership of communities and financial 
institutions. In fact if the financial institutions as a group hold the majority stake and the 
stakes of the communities could be designed to reflect their patronage it would be a 
good combination to work with and scale up. The structure could be replicated only if 
there is a strong systems oriented culture to back up the entire effort. The structure 
may we worth some more experimenting to cover the loopholes, but seems difficult at 
this stage for stand alone microfinance efforts to replicate. However it is possible that 
this structure adequately modified at the intermediary level to have non-for profit 
companies might be a bit more stable. SNFL with its MBTs assumes a mature 
governance structure and given the state of microfinance in India, there possibly would 
be very few entities that could show the same level of maturity.    
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Sir Ratan Tata Trust Fund for Research Collaborations in Micro finance 
Micro finance has been widely acknowledged as a tool for mobilising the poor and 
reaching quality financial services. The field, especially in India, has developed 
largely based on practitioner experience. While the sector has expanded, largely 
through replication, over the past few years, there has also been an increased 
realisation on limitations of micro finance. The Sir Ratan Tata Trust Fund for 
Research Collaborations in Micro finance at Indian Institute of Management 
Ahmedabad (IIMA) supports cutting-edge, field-based research, which reviews and 
guides experience, especially in the Indian context. The project envisages work on 
diverse themes such as:  
•  Understanding financial flows of the poor over long horizons 
•  Understanding financial flows of seasonal migrants 
•  Documentation of transformation experiences of Indian microfinance 
institutions 
•  Documentation of the role of mainstream banks in microfinance. 
Research in progress is put out as working papers. Completed research would be 
published as papers and books. In addition there would be dissemination through 
focussed workshops and training programmes for the practitioners. 
The Sir Ratan Tata Trust is a grant making foundation with interests in the thematic 
areas of education, health, rural livelihoods, arts and culture and enhancing civil 
society and governance. (www.srtt.org)  
IIMA is a leading management institute which offers postgraduate and doctoral 
programmes in management. In addition to research in mainstream areas of 
business and industry IIMA also undertakes extensive work in social sectors such as 
agriculture, education, public systems and infrastructure. The SRTT Fund is hosted in 
the Centre for Management of Agriculture at IIMA. (www.iimahd.ernet.in) 